2026. With Zsuzsanna Chappell. Philosophy of Madness. In The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Disability Studies. ed. D. Bolt. Oxford University Press.

2025. Culpability. In the Springer Handbook of the Philosophy of Medicine, pp. 713-728,. eds. T. Schramme and M. J. Walker. 

2025. With Paul Lodge. Strategy, Pyrrhonian Scepticism and the Allure of Madness. the European Journal of Analytic Philosophy. 21(2): 117-132.

2024. Allegedly impossible experiences. Philosophical Psychology. Online first https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2024.2310628

2024. Retributivism and the objective attitude. Diametros. 21(79): 56-73.

2023. With Zsuzsanna Chappell. Recovery without normalisation: It’s not necessary to be normal, not even in psychiatry. Clinical Ethics. 18(3): 298-305.

2023. A wide enough range of ‘test environments’ for psychiatric disabilities. The Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements. Cambridge University Press. 94: 39-53.

2023. My Strategies for Dealing with Radical Psychotic Doubt: A Schizo-Something Philosopher’s Tale. Schizophrenia Bulletin. 49(5): 1097-1098.

2023. Radical Psychotic Doubt and Epistemology. Philosophical Psychology. 26(8): 1482-1596.

2022. With Daphne Brandenburg. Patronizing Praise. Journal of Ethics. 26: 663-682.

2022. Accountability, Answerability and Attributability: On Different Kinds of Moral Responsibility. The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. Eds. D. Pereboom and D. Nelkin. Oxford University Press.

2022. Exemption, Self-Exemption, and Compassionate Self-Excuse. International Mad Studies Journal. 1(1): e1-21. Republished as a chapter in the Bloomsbury Guide to the Philosophy of Disability, 2023, ed. S. Tremain.

2022. Solving the Self-Illness Ambiguity: the Case for Construction Over Discovery. Philosophical Explorations. 25(3): 294-313.

2021. Psychosis and Intelligibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology. 28(3): 233-249.

2021. Retributivism, Justification and Credence: The Epistemic Argument Revisited. Neuroethics. 14(2): 177-190.

2020. The Agential Perspective: a Hard-Line Reply to the Four-Case Manipulation Argument. Philosophical Studies. 177(1935-1951.

2018. Irrational Option Exclusion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21(3): 537-551.

2016. Reasons, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 19(5): 1225-1240.

2016. Accountability, Answerability and Freedom. Social Theory and Practice. 42(4): 681-70

2016. Non-Elusive Freedom Contextualism. Philosophia. 44(3): 793-808.

2016. Flourishing Dogs: The Case for an Individualized Conception of Welfare and Its Implications. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics. 29(3): 425-438.

2015. Obesity and Obligation. The Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. 25(1): 89-110.

2014. Purebred Dogs and Canine Wellbeing. Journal of Environmental and Agricultural Ethics. 27(3): 417-430.